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Abstract 
 
A critical phenomenology is paired with qualitative data in order to 
understand the character of subjective experiences of uncanniness through 
the encounter with art. We are confronted by art as the beings we have been, 
without recourse to the use of art as a way in which our beings might 
concretely improve themselves, either through rewriting themselves as part 
of the larger world or by giving ourselves a dedicated auto-history. It is this 
feeling of insubstantiality, borne on the currents which move us away from 
all solid projects or monuments, that disconcerts us the most. The experience 
of this non-presence in art uncovers the absence of presence in being and 
world. We have been absented from ourselves in some ethically culpable 
manner, and to be fully present as beings who live on in the face of death, is 
to take into an interiority of being the Nothing which stands as our alterity. 
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Art does not act on the authority of imagining, because it presents its 
meaning within the sensuous and dispenses with seeking beyond the 
given (Dufrenne 1973, 205). 
 
  
  Art often appears otherworldly. Its vision seems not of 
this reality, but of something beyond. Its guide is occlusive, 
even deliberately coy. What it sees it sees for us, but does it let 
us observe the entirety of its truth? Vision is itself an attempt 
at revelation outside of the limits of sight, and can come across 
to us as having its own form of dogmatism which ironically 
limits our ability to see its virtues. But at the same time the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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naked sword of vision cuts through the stuff of this world, and 
stands alone on the horizon it has alone created.  
  One of the insights the vision of art presents to us is a 
fuller understanding of the moment of this world's motion. It is 
well known that certain works freeze or capture such moments 
– the painting of scenes as tableaux, the sculpture as pose, the 
musical work as the expression of a single emotion 
untrammelled by distraction – but beyond these more 
transparent and referential examples, there is also the moment 
of the world's being which is more rarely related to our being in 
the world as it is. Indeed, this kind of vision often suggests to 
us that there is either more to life than we usually give it credit 
for, or that there is extant, contiguous but not overlapping with 
it, another life, qualitatively different, and to which access is 
restricted. The role of art in the lives of worldly persons takes 
on a function similar to species of religion. That our world is 
richer than its mundane life suggests is kindred with the world 
extending soteriologies of Western belief systems such as Islam 
and Christianity. The next world is linked to this one as its 
ideal extension, and one must perform the arts of humanity on 
earth to move beyond their sullied place and fallen state. That 
our world may be overcome in its entirety is kindred with the 
world denying transcendentalities of the Eastern systems, such 
as Buddhism. The next world may be attained only by 
vanquishing the present human world from one's spirit and 
vision. Either way, we are involved in an attempt to improve 
ourselves, to make ourselves more beautiful. Nazism was 
hardly the first incarnation that the world may be made a 
better place through the violence of expurgative death, 
although it was the first to link this idea specifically with art 
and thus make it into both an aesthetics and an ideology. The 
risk that may then immediately be understood when one 
experiences art as something possessing Unheimlichkeit is that 
it proffers to special persons the seer of its vision. In other 
words, akin to religious revelation, the ones who undergo the 
transformative rite of passage of visionary art might well think 
that they have been specifically chosen for such an increase in 
being because they already have some extensive and expansive 
version of humanity bred into them.1 If this breeding is G.V. Loewen / On the Uncanny Subjectivity of Art 
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associated with anything other than art itself, the consequences 
of this belief will be disastrous for all humanity. This is the 
truest lesson of the uncanny in art. 
  With art, however, we do not need to decide whether or 
not it is the case that the mundane world needs be overcome or 
merely extended. Art gives us the option of continuing to live in 
the world, our being itself both overcome and extended, as in 
the hermeneutic experience. The transformational quality of 
the aesthetic encounter is enough to push us on to a new 
version of ourselves, as well as having the ability to preserve 
what it is already about us that will serve as the ground for the 
growth of the new. The seeds, the earth, the water and the sun 
are contained within the aesthetic experience. What the 
character of this new species of life will be is of course shaped 
by many other things, but nowhere else, it seems, do we find 
the confluence of the ingredients of new life more intensely 
focused than in the presentiment of art.  
  The uncanny of art's presence in the world reminds us, 
perhaps more than anything else, of its usual absence in our 
lives. We may feel remorse or regret at this news, for knowledge 
about the absence of the 'larger truth' is itself not usually taken 
as good news. But this simple relation of presence and absence 
does not fully describe the effect of art's uncanniness. Indeed, 
the oddly circumspect but also invasive and trembling presence 
of that very absence – we now know it to be true that we have 
been absented by the presence of Being, that upon our stage 
has trod only beings like ourselves, and those too much like 
ourselves have been our interlocutors – is rather better 
described as 'non-presence', a kind of parousia. There is 
something missing from both our vision and from our 
consciousness. Yet we do not immediately comprehend just 
exactly what this absence signifies regarding its substance. 
'What is the matter?' is a common enough query asked by our 
compatriots when they have observed in us the charge of the 
uncanny, but it is just this kind of question that lacks the 
definitive and substantial response of referentiality. We are, in 
fact, not at all sure what all this was about, or what has just 
transpired. We do know, however, that we have been altered, 
that our substance was originally lacking and it was this META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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absence of the stuff of truth or of beauty, the good or the spirit 
etc. that put us 'at risk' for the encounter with plenitude, 
sometimes playful and sometimes playing. This knowledge 
itself has its own trembling uncanniness about it, or better, it is 
our understanding of ourselves as part of the general absence of 
our ideals in both our lives and in the world that stuns us with 
the resonance of the uncanny, as it often takes some time after 
such experiences to 'shake them off,' as it were. 
  The analysis of art through a phenomenology of the 
uncanny must proceed from this fact alone: that the experience 
of non-presence uncovers the absence of presence in being and 
world. There are categories of what was 'supposed' to be 
present, and what was supposedly present within these 
aesthetic encounters, as we will see below. But whatever we 
may make of what we are missing – have we been morally 
culpable, are we living in ugliness or self-deprecation, do we 
know only other versions of ourselves as other persons, are we 
simply 'uncultured' and ignorant? – it is the radicality of the 
new 'knowingness' that the presentiment of art makes fully 
present to us that we must confront. Simply put, we are 
confronted by art as the beings we have been, without recourse 
to the use of art as a way in which our beings might concretely 
improve themselves, either through rewriting themselves as 
part of the larger world or by giving ourselves a dedicated auto-
history. It is this feeling of insubstantiality, borne on the 
currents which whisk us away from all solid projects or 
monuments, that disconcerts us the most. We have been shown 
up to be less than we had thought in a powerful way, but we are 
not at all sure how to proceed with remedying the situation, 
and we often end by questioning the value or the relevance of 
the uncanny, just as culturally we have at length begun to 
question the once-presumed existence of the otherworldly itself. 
 
The Nature and Effect of Aesthetic Uncanniness 
  
But what is the nature and effect of aesthetic uncanniness? We 
can speak of it in a number of ways: "The poetic image is a 
sudden salience on the surface of the psyche..." (Bachelard 
1964, xi). It is the 'opposite of causality,' for "In this G.V. Loewen / On the Uncanny Subjectivity of Art 
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reverberation, the poetic image will have a sonority of being. 
The poet speaks on the threshold of being." (Bachelard 1964, 
xiii) Anything irruptive to the general run of living on – which 
in itself can be said to consist of everything sudden in an auto-
history of self-sacrifice – can appear as uncanny, which, after 
all, has its base meaning in the experience of the abnormative. 
No other meaning need originally be ascribed to what is deviant 
other than a transgression which is part of the norm and not at 
all alien to it. At the same time, we are seldom content to leave 
it there. The cliquish and obfuscatory attempts of Romantic 
period occultists, who tell us that 'there are things you should 
not know' remind us of nothing more than the early 
Pythagoreans, protecting the sacred mysteries of the square 
root of two or other 'irrational' numbers. This kind of defense of 
the would-be uncanny has no merit. No, the uncanniness of 
human experience, though rare when compared with the wide-
awake-everydayness of the mundane, nevertheless has 
something profound to speak to us about concerning what it 
means to be fully human, and art attests to this dimension of 
being which, for a moment, coincides with the Being of beings 
in the world.  
  If Freud noted that within art there was something alive 
and sonorous beyond the formal content as well as the form of 
media of the work (cf. Horowitz 2001, 119ff), and at the same 
time having its source of action not in our own normative 
observation of the work of art – one says to oneself, 'I am in a 
gallery to see art,' etc. – then we might also describe this 
dimension of being as being able to be at the threshold of itself. 
That same liminal space which we have heard the poet speak of 
is the step into the house of aesthetic experience: "This is the 
uncanniness of art that needs interpretation by a psychical 
work that is never done. It is, we might say, the traumatic 
kernel of historical knowledge." (Horowitz 2001, 119ff) It is 
troublesome because it constitutes precisely an interruption of 
the flow of living on, but not one critical enough to be fatal to 
the threat of being itself. Though it is a "...minor crisis, this 
crisis on the simple level of a new image, contains the entire 
paradox of a phenomenology of the imagination, which is: how 
can an image, at times very unusual, appear to be a META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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concentration of the entire psyche?" (Bachelard 1964, xiv). 
What power does it have to break through the normative run, 
and "…react on other minds and in other hearts, despite all the 
barriers of common sense, all the disciplined schools of thought, 
content in their immobility?" (Bachelard 1964, xv). The answer 
appears to lie within the question. It is the very immobility, not 
of thinking or of thought itself, but of discourse and paradigm, 
either socialized as the culture or learned as a higher culture, 
that blockades the entrance to any liminal space. We are too 
human in our discourses, in the sense that the fully socialized 
human being is a co-conspirator employed at the local social 
prison. If we are to become as well humane, then we must pay 
heed to what unsettles the order of social reality, and presents 
a reality that human science must also interpret, but that the 
rest of us can ignore if we wish: "This prehuman way of seeing 
things is the painter's way. More completely than lights, 
shadows, and reflections, the mirror image anticipates within 
things, the labor of vision." (Merleau-Ponty 1964 b, 168) It is 
this interiority of art that lends itself to our perception that the 
uncanny is something occluded, only partially exposed in the 
aesthetic encounter, alluded to, but included within our 
conscious horizon as one glimpses the loom of a distant ship 
through the binoculars when looking out to sea. But it is not art 
that occludes. The hiddenness of our beings is hidden within us, 
and is brought into the lighted space of being through the 
aesthesia of encounters with works of art. By bringing into our 
present the presence of what is ‘more than us’, art heralds the 
sacred spheres of what must be general, and not specific, to 
humanity: “Anguish arises when the anxious individual is not 
himself stretched tight by the feeling of superabundance. This 
is precisely what evinces the isolated, individual character of 
anguish.” (Bataille 1988, 38-9) This 'state of grace', opposed to 
the semi-conscious anesthesia of living on, confers upon us not 
a soteriological privilege – as was assumed in the pre-modern 
spaces of the sacred associated with religion and all of the 
works of art that had as their purpose the increase of only 
Being – but the grace through which we can endure the 
struggles of daily life.   G.V. Loewen / On the Uncanny Subjectivity of Art 
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  We can proceed from events which are apparently 
immediate and transparent: "What a gesture expresses is 
'there' in the gesture itself. A gesture is something wholly 
corporeal and wholly spiritual at the same time. The gesture 
reveals no inner meaning behind itself. The whole being of the 
gesture lies in what it says." (Gadamer 1986, 79) We can 
proceed here as social beings as if we know the whole story. 
This is, in base and relatively anonymous form, how social 
relations operate. We stereotype the other as a category. We do 
not need to know them as a person. We do the same for social 
interaction, hardly heeding the depths of wellspring for each 
and every person's behaviors, though a detailed genealogy 
would reveal a more authentic pattern to social life. The 
pragmatics of living on dictate these courses to us, and, akin to 
the discourses, we are content to leave well enough alone. It is 
enough of a challenge, admittedly, for each one of us to face the 
uncanny ability of life to waylay the 'best laid of plans.' So a 
phenomenology of the aesthetics of being in the world need not 
be a harbinger of a homiletic. Like Weberian science, this new 
knowledge of self-understanding which we seek through art can 
be taken as a fresh perspective. It may indeed change our lives 
so that our reflections match our experiences – so that thoughts 
catch up with truths – but it alone cannot make the difficult 
decisions for us. This other level, where reflection must always 
and already become self-reflection, imposes itself upon us when 
we consider that there is in fact nothing so transparent about 
even mundane social reality: "At the same time every gesture is 
also opaque in an enigmatic fashion. It is a mystery that holds 
back as much as it reveals. For what the gesture reveals is the 
being of meaning rather than the knowledge of meaning." 
(Gadamer 1986, 79) It is in fact the depth of social interaction 
in everyday reality that sets the stage for the profundity of art, 
for we are very often introduced for the first time to the 
subtlety of the former only through the latter. Unlike science, 
however, our subjective encounter with the work of art does not 
provide as sure a guarantor of predictive certainty. Its presence 
must rest within our own, and we may well include it as part of 
the decision-making that must occur in ethical spheres of social 
action. Just because the nature of the work of culture is given a META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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kind of pre-givenness through art should not suggest that this 
clarity is fully portable across social spheres, say, from that 
aesthetic to that ethical, pace Wittgenstein's suggestive remark. 
If it is true that in the realm of artistic expression "...there is no 
need for a code or convention of interpretation; the meaning is 
as inherent in immediate experience as is that of a flower 
garden" (Dewey 1980, 83), then it is equally true that the 
flowers in that garden have been socially arranged – the very 
term garden refers to such a construct – and that implies 
directly that there must be an a priori and rather formal code 
by which we can understand the experience to be an immediate 
one, and not one of or requiring further reflection. This is all too 
similar to the surface debate between empiricism and 
rationalism, where Humean experience, the source of all 
knowledge, is questioned along the lines of the nature of human 
experience: 'What must there be in order to have an experience 
(at all)?' a Kantian might ask. If construct validities like 
'motion' and 'body' are part of the response to such a query, 
then such universal forestructures of consciousness might well 
be taken for a part of nature, or even part of the non-purposive 
telos of such a nature: "Whatever is alive has its source of 
movement within itself and has the form of self-movement. 
Now play appears as a self-movement that does not pursue any 
particular end or purpose so much as movement as movement, 
exhibiting so to speak a phenomenon of excess, of living self-
representation. And in fact that is just what we perceive in 
nature..." (Gadamer 1986, 23). Even such a phenomenon has its 
uncanniness rooted in the fact that we expect some source of 
movement that could be demonstrated to be external to the 
object or to the organism. How is it that we even have a 
consciousness, let alone a reflective and duplicative one? How is 
it that the movement of beings corresponds to that of the nature 
of Being? Without the metaphysics of an idealism which 
suggests form regulates and 'predates' both appearance and 
content, an understanding that cannot in itself explain the 
concept of form or the cosmogony of the prime mover other than 
that of a regressive creation, one must look for the apparently 
unlikely and strangely present non-presence of being within 
one's own perception. Not an anthropism, not a solipsism, but a G.V. Loewen / On the Uncanny Subjectivity of Art 
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recognizance that one is also part of the nature of being even as 
one rescores the instrumentation of beings by becoming alert to 
this presence: "...this sense is immanent in the sensuous being 
its very organization. The sensuous is given first and sense is 
regulated by it." (Dufrenne 1973, 12) Immanence is a 
characteristic of the sacred as well as of the irruptive. In such a 
sense as that phenomenological, immanence is the character of 
what cannot be characterized merely as sense, or through the 
sensate structure of consciousness. Ritual, vision, the solidarity 
of orison, the glossalalia, or the ‘speaking in tongues’ of diverse 
tensions come to find a home in the succor of the hypostasized 
community. All these we search for in art. But they confront us 
most precisely with the sudden presence of the uncanny that is 
already within the relationship between art and its public. Art 
confronts the individuated observer and forces him to consider 
becoming a double; both as the other in the work, but also as 
another observer who also encounters the same work Art serves 
the hypostatic purpose of ritual for a society that is suspicious 
of the politics and normative social control of ritual: "A work of 
art elicits and accentuates this quality of being a whole and of 
belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the 
universe in which we live. This fact, I think, is the explanation 
of that feeling of exquisite intelligibility and clarity we have in 
the presence of an object that is experienced with aesthetic 
intensity. It explains also the religious feeling that accompanies 
intense esthetic perception." (Dewey 1980, 195) Yet just 
because we have the feeling of intensity does not mean we have 
any formal clarity as to what exactly is possessing us. Indeed, it 
is this 'oceanic feeling' that Freud famously disdains that 
contains all of the vastness of the cosmos, yet also all of the 
vagueness that is echoed in reflection with others about the 
event after it has been experienced. Persons communicate 'as if' 
what they knew was the same thing, or as if their experiences 
of it generated the same feelings and meaning for them. All of 
this, in sober second light or apart from the group, or without 
the markers of art itself, seems quite unlikely, even romantic. 
So we are left with the sense that what has occurred has indeed 
done so at the expense of full and certain knowledge of it, and 
could have only occurred in this manner, whatever META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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rationalizations may be supplied later on. We must come to the 
conclusion that "Something in art must resist coming to 
conceptual clarity despite sustained reflection on it, and so art 
must be the bearer, not just of instance of the uncanny, but of 
the dynamic of uncanniness itself." (Horowitz 2001, 126-7) 
Certainly in modernity, art often ironically appears as the most 
normative experiential space in which to go searching for the 
abnormative. Indeed, this serious journey can be co-opted by 
fetish and market, as well as rationalized settings of 
observation as in the Louvre or the Vatican, where guided tours 
take the place of self-reflection. Because these spaces where art 
is archived, the modern reliquaries of the sacred objects, are as 
such socially sanctioned spaces of deviance and subjectivity, it 
is possible that they ultimately defeat the very thrust of the 
uncanny with the parry of the hyper-rational.  
  Yet the sensibility of such places should not impinge on 
the things that they house and sanctify. Their utter spatiality is 
itself a sign that one needs some room to negotiate new 
chambers of the heart of beings. Present fullness demands of us 
that we also fully attend to the present in which we encounter 
the gift of hypostasized consciousness. The task falls to us more 
fully when we attempt to link the uncanny with the context in 
which it apparently occurred: "It is impossible to understand 
perception as the imputation of a certain significance to certain 
sensible signs, since the most immediate sensible texture of 
these signs cannot be described without referring to the object 
they signify." (Merleau-Ponty 1964 a, 51) Our very objection to 
the uncanny – in the form of the ungeheuer of alienated being, 
of homesickness or discomfort that exclaims within us that we 
wish to return to what we know, or can know – is the first and 
necessary part of action directed toward the object or the work 
of art that brings it into our field of sensibility. We know first 
and foremost that it is strange to us, but even this zero degree 
of experience allows all further ones to evolve. What the ends 
are include a new knowledge that part of our very selves was 
also strange to us, and that part of ourselves may well be 
strange to others. With the uncanny, the hermeneutics of 
existence is radically delineated. We must face ourselves as if 
we know not who we face, nor who must do the facing. In this G.V. Loewen / On the Uncanny Subjectivity of Art 
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estrangement of the uncanny we are made unfamiliar to what 
we have been. This is essentially the characteristic of all 
hermeneutic experience, such as that it at first overcomes prior 
prejudice by ignoring it, by pretending that it did not exist. In 
this way, the uncanny short-circuits our expectations, both of 
our own reactions and of what art might or should be like. It 
forces us to scramble in front of it, its play is unforeseen, and 
we have no immediate defense against it. As with the once 
unfamiliar  topos of modernist painting, "We must make an 
active contribution of our own and make an effort to synthesize 
the outlines of the various planes as they appear on the canvas. 
Only then, perhaps, can we be seized and uplifted by the 
profound harmony and rightness of a work, in the same way as 
readily happened in earlier times on the basis of pictorial 
content common to all." (Gadamer 1986, 8) If in agrarian 
societies there was an aesthetic solidarity more mechanical 
than in our own, it was still the narrative that images 
portrayed – as if the momentary morality of this or that 
symbolic juxtaposition, the Knight and Death, or St. Jerome 
and the Lion, etc. – was at once part of a larger ongoing 
narrative but also, and more importantly, could leap out of such 
a syntagmatic chain of signifiers and become the most salient of 
significant symbols. The uncanniness of pre-modern art 
assumes one knows the story well, and thus is prepared in a 
very different sense for a sudden vision or revelatory 
inspiration that might occur in its presence. Yet further back, 
the great pilgrimages of the medieval period attested to the 
profound desire on the part of human beings to indeed 
encounter aesthesis in the form of itself as a sacred subspecific. 
Art in the service of an organized belief system was able, 
through the experience of its awesome vaults and spires, to 
transcend the mere norms of ritual and worship which also took 
place in the same spaces and within the gaze of the same works 
of art. Rituals of all kinds being as well theater, need their 
stages, props, scripts and actors. But it is the setting that 
backdrops and allows the scene to transport us outside of the 
mundane spheres of social life which have their contrasting 
settings. At the same time, the sacred is only understandable as 
something from within which the uncanny may present itself if META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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we do not completely forget the social scenery where such 
events occur much more rarely: "The builder, then, does not set 
apart and enclose a void, but instead a certain dwelling place of 
forms, and, in working on space, he models it, within and 
without, like a sculptor." (Focillon 1989, 76) Insofar as 
architecture is akin to the organ of musical instruments in its 
relations to other art media, the architect is the composer of 
spaces, spaces through which time is diverted in its regular 
flow in calculated ways. There is a damming up of the tensions 
between past and present, and thus a more intense character of 
life can be presented there. We are more aware of our 
connections with the tradition and with the dead in these places 
than in any others. "He is a geometrician in the drafting of a 
plan, a mechanic in the assembling of a structure, a painter in 
the distribution of visual effects and a sculptor in the treatment 
of masses." (Focillon 1989, 76) When we, at long last, weary of 
the regularity of the flow of temporal life and its necessary 
routines, enter both into and unto such a space, we are 
ourselves opened up by its architecture. We become more 
intimate with its surroundings in the same way that we become 
greater adepts and acolytes regarding self-understanding. 
Other humans created this place, but once created its voice is 
that of both their collective labors but as well, holds within its 
chorus a new voice, far older, of the tradition and what may lie 
beyond it. We are emptied of our quotidean cares, we are 
shaken from our ennui, we are uplifted from our marginality, 
and we are arrested in our imagination. We are presented with 
the words of life writ large, with a textuality as ancient as the 
social contract, though in a grandiose and static form: "The 
reader of the Text may be compared to someone at loose end 
(someone slackened off from any imaginary); this passable 
empty subject strolls – it is what happened to the author of 
these lines, then it was that he had a vivid idea of the Text – on 
the side of a valley..." (Barthes 1977, 159). Here, then, is a 
recipe for the abiding taste of the other-world. 
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The Unsettling Force of the Uncanny 
  
But the notion of the threshold for which art is the handmaiden 
does not include all forms of the uncanny. And in fact the 
uncanny relies heavily on our imaginations, cultural as these 
are, but also personal and based on specific sets of experiences 
no one else has quite been involved with as have we. If part of 
that which we are to understand as part of ourselves is that we 
too, within the interiority of being in the world, possess and are 
possessed by the uncanny, then this other part of our being 
takes the form of a character from the other-world. Even in 
modernity, it is the unconscious that speaks to us of this 
relation metaphorically using the Traumdeutung of 
idiosyncratic allegory, but as well the patterned symbolic 
structure of the culture of the day; the train, for instance, no 
longer augurs a guise of death to us as trains have faded from 
the actual landscape, have become quaint rather than 
threatening and thus have become mute as symbols of the 
imagination. We thus need a world where its denizens and their 
scenes have a particular use: "...he could use them to elucidate 
his problems of the union of soul and body. I myself consider 
literary documents as realities of the imagination, pure 
products of the imagination. And why should the actions of the 
imagination not be as real as those of perception?" (Bachelard 
1964, 158) Yet there is a difference here, one that presents itself 
to us as a different reality. The order of reality corresponds to 
the nature of order in worlds that are usually set apart, but yet 
come together through the human imagination. These worlds 
might be characterized in a number of ways, nature and 
culture, the mundane and the extramundane, heaven and earth 
etc., but in each dyad the other is always present. Their reality 
is indeed of an equal stature, but only because they co-mingle. 
Culture is one of the adaptive results of nature, the judgement 
of what is extraordinary based on our knowledge of the routine, 
paradise our ultimate aspiration for this world and not some 
other. The true difference between them is marked by the 
manner in which they are presented to our consciousness: 
"There is no obscurity of feeling, which knows the expressed 
object, but only for the understanding, which knows the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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represented object." (Dufrenne 1973, 411) As with all things 
elliptically apophantic, all events that might come to us as 
epiphanies, it is only our perspective of worlds in collision that 
allows the feeling of union with the sacred through the vehicle 
of art's uncanniness to be known without ambiguity. Many 
research participants spoke ‘around’ the experience of the 
uncanny: “I can’t say that I have ever had an experience with 
one particular piece of art that affected me greatly. But I have 
seen many pieces of art that left me in awe, and speechless, 
absolutely marveling at the creativity and ingenuity of human 
beings." (FTNA). What we are experiencing truly is different in 
the sense that it comes to us, not in no uncertain terms, but 
with no terms other than a negation of the quality of living ever 
onward towards death. Yet it is our very knowledge of what this 
latter quality is, both in its overwhelming but finite quantity 
and its moment by moment ambiguity, that allows the feeling of 
the uncanny to be ironically transparent: "Such fullness of 
emotion and spontaneity of utterance come, however, only to 
those who have steeped themselves in experiences of objective 
situations; to those whose imaginations have long been 
occupied with reconstructing what they see and hear. 
Otherwise, the state is more like one of frenzy in which the 
sense of orderly production is subjective and hallucinatory." 
(Dewey 1980, 72). The full presence of the present is held 
within the confluence of the attention it takes to focus on the 
work of art. Since art challenges our mundane expectations, our 
predictive and predicative assumptions, we are stilled by its 
presence. We must contemplate its surfaces or its sonorities, 
and we must then begin to feel our own presence in a world 
that has itself been stilled. Perhaps what is generally 
characteristic of the uncanny in art is this lack of motion, 
almost as if our heart has been stopped and we are close to a 
kind of death. The temporary absence of the motion of the world 
and the dynamic which includes ourselves in its motion is oddly 
disconcerting. There is an aloneness to our experience while at 
the same time a very clear awareness that we are not alone, but 
have been joined by another voice, perhaps long dormant, which 
awakens itself through our presence. None of this appears to 
have anything to do with how we usually live and speak: G.V. Loewen / On the Uncanny Subjectivity of Art 
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"…there are no commonplace expressions, like gestures or 
grimaces, of a sense of mass and power, of a delight in nature [ ] 
and that further explains why expressions of the latter sort are 
less frequently discussed; they are simply not encountered very 
often by most people." (Sircello 1972, 63) If not, perhaps, we 
would not in fact become so suddenly aware that there has been 
a shift in the worlding of the world, a movement towards the 
moment that encapsulates our existence. We are forever held 
within the now, and just because this will also ever pass on 
does not negate its only present function of letting us be. There 
is an immediate analogy to the work of art as it is used in 
subjectivity with the kinds of discourse which attempt to hold 
on to the moment and force its acquiescence to either projection, 
memory, or identity. But it is the presence of the uncanny that 
unsettles these ideas of stasis, because it is the uncanny which 
can arrest the entirety of the world and our being at once, and 
does not rest upon the contrivance of projects which must 
remain in a world which passes like clouds.  
 
The Existential Dimension of the Uncanny 
  
When art is expressed as what appears to be our everyday 
language, the effect is even more startling, as we are made 
aware that language itself, even without poetry, entails the 
essence of being as existence and not stasis: "The intellectualist 
philosopher who wants to hold words to their precise meaning, 
and uses them as the countless little tools of clear thinking is 
bound to be surprised by the poet's daring." (Bachelard 1964, 
146) As with art in general, the truest sign of the uncanny is 
that it brings us home to reality. What is now made real for us 
is the fact of our existence and the fact of the world, ever 
ambiguous and ever passing, and the discomfort we feel in the 
face of reality is that we can never truly find a home in such a 
world, never truly become at home in language, unless of course 
we adopt the uncanny into ourselves. This adoption implies 
that there is a home for what is homeless in humanity, and that 
this home is within our own beings. If, as Bachelard continues, 
'language itself dreams' (Bachelard 1964, 146), then the 
dreamless dream of living on takes place in and as language, META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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and its significance is held within the reality it can construct, 
always a moving target, already an anonymity and a question. 
And this realization takes place not through the language of 
ordinary speech and writing alone, but in any media in which 
art finds its own home: "There remains an ineliminable 
connection between what we like to call the wordless language 
of music and the verbal language of normal linguistic 
communication. Perhaps there is also a similar connection 
between the objective vision with which we orient ourselves in 
the world, and the claim that art makes upon us both to 
construct new compositions directly from the elements of the 
objective visible world and to participate in the profound 
tensions that they set up." (Gadamer 1986, 38-9) Very often it 
takes something other than 'normal communication' to get the 
point across in its fullness of presence. We are, indeed, more 
often led to rationalize this or that event through the over-
much pseudo-interpretation that has its origin in the 
idiomachies of 'live and learn' or 'that's life.' But just exactly 
what is this life that we are learning from, and what is it that 
we learn? Or is it not that we learn to live, rather than the 
more blithe manner of happenstance such idioms suggest? No 
doubt we also do not learn, depending on the context, or that we 
may equally learn not to learn. The fullness of the present's 
presence presents itself to us as irruptive and unwilling to let 
us unlearn its lesson. Like anxiety proper, the uncanny, very 
often seen as a vehicle for the former, has a positive existential 
function for us. It does not know how to 'leave us alone' as do 
other persons, many of our memories—pride can conquer 
conscience in this regard, as Nietzsche famously noted—or even 
social institutions once they are satisfied in their bureaucratic 
requirements. The uncanniness of the uncanny is that it is 
ever-present, waiting pensively in the shadows of the everyday, 
whose light cannot fully illuminate every space of being as it 
flickers its way to and from its mundane zenith. Research 
participants were quite aware that they had been enveloped by 
the penetrating penumbra of the uncanny in their various 
encounters with art. The following was suggestive of many 
other examples: 
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I had just been permanently estranged from my 
spouse through the perambulations of her mental 
illness. I found myself in the Minneapolis Institute of 
Art, and when I encountered the large Rembrandt 
housed there – a Biblical figure whose name I cannot 
recall, but whose story was one of gender role and 
betrayal; Rembrandt shows her in the act of plunging 
a knife into her side, looking at the viewer with great 
remonstrance – I gazed at this painting and 
immediately fell to my knees with sorrow and wept, 
right in the gallery! I realized later that I had been 
suppressing the guilt I felt in losing my wife through 
such a horrible betrayal – that of illness, certainly, but 
also that I had betrayed her somehow by not seeing 
her through it. (FTNA) 
  
  What was already present comes only to its full presence 
in the void of rationalized meanings. Sometimes this presence, 
and our presence within it, is an abyss, bringing to the fullest 
consciousness – which also includes the unconscious and the 
consciousness of others insofar as they are relevant – our 
character and role in this or that life event. What occurred is 
what is now occurring to us. We have felt its whole for the first 
time. Indeed, the uncanny reminds us that we seldom feel the 
whole of any part of our lives, as the onrush of time keeps our 
focus from discerning the true shape of things as they hurtle by, 
rather like looking at a rushing river. The foreshortening and 
distanciation of running and coursing water precludes a certain 
focus, and to rest one's eyes on one spot in the river is to see 
merely the flow of different waters, constant and continuous. 
When the aesthetic encounter recreates the work of art as a 
quasi-subject in the world of both subjects and objects, it 
immobilizes us as a quasi-object. The effect is often dramatic 
and transformational, as well as intensely disturbing or yet 
comfortable, pending the association: "There is interest in 
completing an experience. The experience may be one that is 
harmful to the world and its consummation undesirable. But it 
has aesthetic quality." (Dewey 1980, 39) That we need to know 
only ourselves in such a moment, but that we come to such a 
self-understanding through the work of others, and furthermore 
that it leads to an understanding of an other which had been 
effaced or forgotten, are the hallmarks of authentic and 
dramatic living: "This is the metaphysical reason for the 
concentration of drama in time, of the condition of unity of time. 
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timelessness of this moment which is yet the whole of life." 
(Lukacs 1974, 158) 
  However full the encounter with art makes the present, 
it does so by the suggestion that what is present is so by virtue 
of the movement of being from another kind of time, and from 
another world than our own. Just as we are judged by the 
present, the situations we have created or find ourselves in, we 
also, by implication, suggest to ourselves that another kind of 
judgement is also pressing in upon us, and this too emanates 
from another kind of world or being. The uncanny in art thus 
confronts us with a set of simple questions: What kind of being? 
What kind of judgement? What are we to do in the face of the 
beyond? Research participants were apt to make the idea of 
other-worldliness into a stringent allegory, and not merely a 
metaphor, but an aesthetic analytic need not pursue any native 
position that stretches beyond the pragmatic counsel of art 
itself. If the work of art is confronting us with our deficits, it 
also reaffirms our strengths, and in fact uses both weakness 
and credit to render its communication to us with greater 
clarity. Whatever it is we are missing, in other words, art can 
supply if we are open to its insight. Whatever it is we possess, 
art can magnify if we are open to transforming our experience, 
sharing it within the new realm of aesthetic quasi-subjectivity. 
We need not be, then, too apt in our approximation of this 
world's flaws when we encounter what we take to be a better 
world through the windows of the arts. It is not as if we alone 
embody all the frailties of the human subject in the world. No 
doubt we each of us have our fair share of them, but art does 
not personalize in the sense of finding fault with us. One of the 
major ways in which art touches our being and changes its 
vision over the generations is that it can have similar effects on 
many different kinds of persons. Although participants in this 
research were also apt to personalize their encounters with art, 
once again an analytic cannot afford to dwell on the supposed 
idiosyncracies of each person's soulful experience as if this were 
the end of even the data.  
  We must surmise, rather, that the aesthetic object now 
re-presenced in the world as a quasi-subject also takes action in 
that world, action which transforms its own presence by 
altering the course of our perceptions. The quasi-subject has a 
kind of moral volition, and if in its self-representation it takes 
on the trappings of an intentional stance borrowed from the 
mythological narratives of the age in which art began its moral 
career, it does so only to impress upon us its historical as well G.V. Loewen / On the Uncanny Subjectivity of Art 
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as its ultimate relevance. We do the same. We are also not 
embodiments of a morality per se, but remain, nevertheless, 
moral beings in a world which has been shaped by the 
principles of morality and of late, anti-morality. The light or the 
darkness that we find ensconced as tropes of the other-world 
are made fully present in this one through the aesthetic 
encounter. Art makes plain the ideals of good and evil in a 
world where such a moral spectrum is moribund and sometimes 
bankrupt. At the same time, art reminds us that even if such a 
worldview and its evaluations are mute, persons practice a 
pragmatic version of these judgements regularly, and those 
that are subject to them feel such as are their consequences to 
be very real.  
 
Conclusions 
  
The full presence of non-presence in the present is a reasonable 
working definition of the uncanny. We have seen that it is a 
necessary phase or experience within the aesthetic encounter, 
but of course it is not limited to the work of art and its public. 
Perhaps it may also occur during the trophotropic states of 
consciousness, where our senses are not aligned with sensory 
inputs, or less often but still common enough, in religious 
venues, as well as the sudden events where the character of the 
neighbor appears within us. However this may be, we do know 
that the uncanny cannot brook the world as it has been. It has a 
mission to disturb it and ourselves within it, otherwise our 
experience of art is predestined from the outside, from indeed 
that self-same world that art is supposed to extend and open 
up. If we are not challenged openly and transparently by the 
opacity that the uncanny swirls around us then we can be 
complacent to the point of being manipulated by what gives the 
appearance of being aesthetic. Gadamer reminds us that this is 
the source of both artism and the artful use of art forms for 
ulterior motives, such as in advertising: "We notice that such 
art has designs upon us. All kitsch has something of this forced 
quality about it. It is often well meant and sincere in intention, 
but it means the destruction of art. For something can only be 
called art when it requires that we construe the work by 
learning to understand the language of form and content so 
that communication really occurs." (Gadamer 1986, 52) The 
apprehension we feel in front of the new and strange is what 
gives these communications the aura of the vision. We no META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IV (1) / 2012 
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longer set out in socially sanctioned quests for such visions, as 
did traditional social organizations, but nevertheless, we as 
human beings still require of ourselves that we experience 
them, for the 'destruction of art' implies the loss of humanity, 
and where we burn the books of what it means to be human, we 
next burn ourselves. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 Questions relating to the subjective experience of what proffered itself as 
uncanny or eldritch were asked of forty persons, artists (FTA) and non-artists 
(FTNA) alike. Some of their responses from interview and survey transcripts 
appear in the below to lend another kind of ground to the philosophical 
understandings of aesthetic experience.  
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